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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Nuba peoples are an indigenous ethnic group living in the 
area of the Nuba mountains in Southern Kordofan in central Sudan. 
They include a variety of tribes in the Nuba mountains, but what 
connects them is a common culture and way of life. Salih observes 
“the Nuba are indeed the indigenous peoples of the Nuba Mountains; 
they have the strongest ties to their lands and have lived in this 
region before colonization.”1 They earn their livelihood through 
agriculture and raising animals. The Nuba peoples have throughout 
the centuries been subjected to systematic human rights violations, 
ethnic cleansing, and superior race policies by different colonial 
masters ranging from British colonists to Arabs. Such attempts have 
not ceased. The Sudanese government’s attempts to subdue and 
demolish them have intensified after Southern Sudan declared its 
independence on June 9, 2011.2 Most recently, The New York Times 
reported on July 3, 2011, that the Sudanese army has “been 
relentlessly pounding the Nuba Mountains from Russian-made 
Antonov bombers for weeks . . . . Hundreds of civilians have been 
killed, including many children. Bombs have been dropped on huts, 
on farmers in the field, on girls fetching water together, slicing them 
in half with buckets in their hands.”3  
 
 1. Guma Kunda Komey, The Denied Land Rights of the Indigenous Peoples 
and Their Endangered Livelihood and Survival: The Case of the Nuba of the 
Sudan, 31 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 991, 991–1008 (2008). 
 2. See Jeffery Gettleman, Sudanese Struggle to Survive Endless Bombings 
Aimed to Quell Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
07/04/world/africa/04sudan.html?ref=sudan (reporting that the Sudanese 
government may be using violence to preemptively discourage further secession 
movements). 
 3. Id.; see also Matteo Fagotto, Nuba Mountains Bear Scars of Sudan’s 
Forgotten War, Guardian, July 3, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ 
jul/03/nuba-mountains-scars-sudan-war (describing the effect of the Sudanese 
conflict on the region’s residents); Southern Kordofan - January 13, 2012, Tomo 
Križnar Found.: Eyes & Ears of God, http://www.tomokriznar.com/ang/ 
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The land is central to the Nuba peoples’ cultural existence, 
language, customs, identity, and socioeconomic survival. Customary 
laws have traditionally regulated land tenure in the Nuba mountains. 
However, the Sudanese land tenure system has undermined the 
ancestral land rights of the indigenous Nuba peoples.4 The modern 
Sudanese state has seriously disregarded the Nuba peoples’ ancestral 
lands. The Nuba peoples have been pushed “systematically to the 
margin of their customarily owned land.”5 Further, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement did not resolve issues of land 
ownership.6 All in all, the ancestral lands of the Nuba peoples are 
critical to their survival and development. Without their lands, an 
important feature of their cultural identity would be swept away.  
The precarious situation of the Nuba peoples is illustrative of the 
general situation of indigenous peoples, and it poses a number of 
pertinent questions relating to state obligations concerning 
indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral lands. In many parts of 
the world, indigenous people are left without judicial recourse to 
enforce their land rights.7 Pasqualucci aptly notes that “[i]ndigenous 
peoples have long suffered violations of their basic land rights, either 
perpetrated by the state or by third parties who operate free of state 
interference.”8 The rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral 
lands are group rights. Similarly, Clinton notes that the 
“[e]xpropriation of the land and resources of indigenous peoples for 
the benefit of the dominant colonial society recurs in most sagas of 
colonial contact between indigenous populations and the colonial 
 
index.php?li=12-01m17_southern_kordofan (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) (showing 
pictures of civilians who were wounded and displaced in the conflict). 
 4. See Komey, supra note 1, at 992, 996. 
 5. Id. at 1007. 
 6. Id. at 1004–06 (explaining that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has 
not resulted in effective safeguards against government land grabbing or protection 
of customary land rights). 
 7. See, e.g., Alexandra Xanthaki, Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in South-
East Asia, 4 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 478–79 (2003) (providing the example of 
Sarawak, Malaysia, where indigenous peoples who protest the takeover of their 
lands without their consent are “detained without trial and harassed by the police”). 
 8. Jo M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the 
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS. INT’L. L.J., 51, 
59 (2010). 
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power.”9 Do states have normative obligations to observe indigenous 
peoples’ rights to their ancestral lands? If so, what are their sources 
and the nature and scope of such obligations? What happens when 
states infringe on and deprive indigenous people of access to their 
ancestral lands? Or when they systematically wipe out the ancestral 
indigenous territory of indigenous peoples? Where can indigenous 
peoples bring claims for violations of their rights? 
The moral underpinning of indigenous land rights lies in the 
cultural, historical, emotional, social, economic, and “spiritual 
relationship that indigenous peoples have with their ancestral 
lands.”10 Ancestral lands often include sacred sites, sacred 
cemeteries, and places of worship, which are a condition sine qua 
non for the “transmission of their culture and beliefs to future 
generations.”11 In other words, ancestral lands create and maintain 
the cultural identity of indigenous peoples. Without access to their 
ancestral lands, indigenous peoples are stripped of an element of 
their cultural identity. Article 25 of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (“UN Declaration”) notes that “[i]ndigenous 
peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive 
spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal sea and other 
resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in 
this regard.”12 
The moral legitimacy of their rights lies in indigenous peoples’ 
traditional connection with the lands they inhabit or used to inhabit. 
Indigenous peoples understand property as a group right, not as 
individual rights.13 The customary law of indigenous peoples, 
therefore, gives priority to a group land tenure system in which 
everybody can use the land and cultural institutions, houses, gardens, 
schools, workshops, and surroundings because they are the property 
of the indigenous community as a whole.14 Every member of the 
 
 9. Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group 
Rights, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 745–46 (1990). 
 10. Pasqualucci, supra note 8, at 56. 
 11. Id. at 56–57. 
 12. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 25, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), 46 I.L.M. 1013 (2007). 
 13. Pasqualucci, supra note 8, at 64. 
 14. Id. 
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community can use this property depending on his or her needs.15 
The Preamble to the UN Declaration notes that “indigenous 
peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their 
existence, well-being and integral development as peoples.”16 What 
is more, indigenous peoples should be treated equally while enjoying 
their rights. Alfredsson aptly notes that “the rights of indigenous 
peoples . . . are part and parcel of human rights and should be treated 
in the same manner.”17 Even more eloquently, Wiessner states, “the 
collective consciousness of indigenous peoples, often expressed in 
creation stories or similar sacred tales of their origin, places them 
unequivocally and since time immemorial at the location of their 
physical existence.”18 It is not just a physical place that is important, 
but “their beliefs make remaining at that place a compelling dictate 
of faith.”19 It is not only indigenous peoples’ customs, culture, 
history, language, and traditions that are important, but also their 
spiritual connection to their ancestral lands. This is also the 
reasoning behind the collective indigenous land tenure system. 
The remainder of this article is therefore devoted to exploring 
states’ obligations with regard to the rights of indigenous peoples. It 
will attempt to explore the nature, value, and scope of these 
obligations and to answer whether there are uniform international or 
national legal standards concerning indigenous peoples’ rights to 
their ancestral lands. The task will be divided into five steps. Section 
II provides a definition of indigenous peoples. Section III discusses 
and analyzes sources of state obligations concerning indigenous land 
rights. The nature and scope of those state obligations are discussed 
in Section IV. Section V discusses the enforcement of state 
obligations to observe indigenous land rights. It does so in three 
steps: first, by discussing and analyzing compliance with the views 
 
 15. Id. (describing the collective nature of land use surrounding indigenous 
settlements, including the custom of open hunting and gathering). 
 16. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 12, pmbl. 
 17. Gudmundur Alfredsson, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples with a Focus on 
the National Performance and Foreign Policies of the Nordic Countries, 59 
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 529, 529 (1999), available at http://www.zaoerv.de/59_ 
1999/59_1999_2_a_529_542.pdf. 
 18. Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Achievement and Continuing Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 134 (2011). 
 19. Id. 
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of the UN Human Rights Committee; second, by examining the 
enforcement mechanism under the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and ILO Convention No. 169; and third, by 
examining the monitoring system of the Inter-American Convention 
on Human Rights. Section VI assesses the normative framework de 
lega lata as to indigenous rights to ancestral territories. On the basis 
of this analysis, the conclusion in Section VII assesses the added 
value of state obligations regarding indigenous land rights and how 
they could be better implemented in the future. Overall, the article 
argues that states have obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil 
indigenous land rights stemming from both national legal orders and 
international law.  
II. DEFINING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
Indigenous land rights are the subject of some controversy in 
international human rights law and are particularly opposed by states 
and territories in the Americas, Asia, and Oceania, which were 
“discovered” by European explorers from the fifteenth century 
onward.20 As it turned out, most of those territories were inhabited by 
peoples now known as “indigenous peoples.”21 Christopher 
Columbus’s voyage to the shores of the Bahamas started in the 
autumn of 1492, a dark chapter in the history of the indigenous 
peoples of Central and South America. Those who were not killed by 
previously unknown diseases were subjected to inhuman treatment 
by European conquerors.22 Bartolomé de las Casas witnessed the 
atrocities and argued that indigenous peoples are free and entitled to 
human dignity.23 De las Casas argued that people should be treated 
 
 20. See, e.g., Serv Wiemers, The International Legal Status of North American 
Indians After 500 Years of Colonization, 5 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 69, 70 (1992) 
(explaining that some North American Indian peoples have sought international 
recognition of their rights due to their dissatisfaction with the domestic 
government policies of the United States and Canada). 
 21. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d 
ed. 2004) (asserting that indigenous peoples are distinguished from dominant 
portions of society due to their ancestral ties to the land); PATRICK THORNBERRY, 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). 
 22. See EDUARDO GALEANO, LAS VENAS ABIERTAS DE AMERICA LATINA 
(2005). 
 23. See G.C. Marks, Indigenous Peoples in International Law: The 
Significance of Francisco de Vitoria and Barolome de Las Casas, 13 AUSTL. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 28 (1992) (reporting that Las Casas recognized that denigration of 
  
2013] INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS TO ANCESTRAL LANDS 1135 
equally. He described his thesis more specifically in his main work, 
Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias.24 He concludes 
his book with the following words: “Y con color de que sirven al 
Rey deshonran a Dios y roban y destruyen al Rey” (roughly 
translated as, “And with which interest they serve the King, they 
dishonor God and steal from and destroy the King”).25 
There is no consensus on the meaning of the term “indigenous 
people” in international law. However, as Alfredsson observes, “the 
practices and instruments of States and international organizations, 
as well as scholarly writings, contain significant indications as to the 
contents of the term peoples.”26 He then argues that “territory is the 
main basis for the definition of a people [together with] common 
national, ethnic, linguistic and/or religious characteristics of the 
groups and their desire to maintain and develop their communities.”27 
Common culture is therefore another important feature when 
defining indigenous peoples.28 Other important features are common 
history, traditions, and language. Jose Martinez Cobo, former UN 
Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Indigenous 
Communities, Peoples and Nations, defined indigenous peoples as: 
those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-
colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves 
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of 
society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis 
of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own 
cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system.29 
 
indigenous peoples’ status and capacity to self-govern was used by Europeans to 
justify colonization). 
 24. Brevísima Relación de la Destrucción de las Indias: Fray Bartolomé de las 
Casas, CIUDAD SEVA, http://www.ciudadseva.com/textos/otros/brevisi.htm (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
 25. Id. (author’s translation). 
 26. Gudmundur Alfredsson, Peoples, MAX PLANCK ENCYLOPEDIA OF PUB. 
INT’L LAW, http://www.mpepil.com/, para. 2 (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
 27. Id. para. 18. 
 28. See Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Cultural Rights in International Law, 
2 EUR. J.L. REFORM 343 (2000). 
 29. Secretariat of the Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues, The Concept of 
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Similarly, Anaya notes that indigenous peoples can be defined as 
“the living descendants of preinvasion inhabitants of lands now 
dominated by others. Indigenous peoples, nations, or communities 
are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by 
settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest.”30 
Alternatively, Wiessner notes that “indigenous peoples are 
vulnerable organic groups with a special relationship to their 
ancestral lands.”31 All four definitions share common patterns, which 
include territory and common cultural characteristics.  
III. THE SOURCES OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS 
A state’s human rights obligations derive from a particular 
normative system at the national or international level. Indigenous 
peoples are entitled to the same rights that apply to individuals and 
peoples.32 The right to property is generally accepted in most 
domestic constitutional legal orders and in international law.33 For 
instance, Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms notes that 
“[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions.”34 The normative thrust of state obligations 
concerning indigenous land rights derives from the international and 
national levels.  
A. INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS  
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Indigenous land rights derive from several international human 
 
Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. PFII/2004/WS.1/3 (Jan. 2004). 
 30. ANAYA, supra note 21, at 3. 
 31. Wiessner, supra note 18, at 138. 
 32. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 12, art. 1. 
 33. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 17, G.A. Res. 217A 
(III), U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“1. Everyone has the right to own property 
alone as well as in association with others. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his property.”). 
 34. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, 262 (entered into 
force May 18, 1954). 
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rights documents. International law standards provide the lowest 
common denominators agreed upon and binding on part or all of the 
international community.35 Indigenous peoples enjoy the right to 
property, which derives in particular from the second part of ILO 
Convention 169 concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in 
independent countries.36 Article 13(1) provides that “Convention 
governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and 
spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with 
the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or 
otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this 
relationship.”37 
Although the above provision does not directly provide for the 
right of indigenous peoples to their traditional ancestral lands, it 
nonetheless imposes obligations on states to do no harm to the 
cultural and spiritual values of indigenous peoples’ lands.38 
Indigenous territory can be defined as the “habitat necessary for their 
collective life, activities, self-government, and cultural and social 
reproduction . . . .”39 Moreover, indigenous peoples’ rights of 
ownership and possession derive from Article 14 of ILO Convention 
169, which provides that rights of peoples “shall be recognized” only 
 
 35. See S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, The Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American 
Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 36 (2001) (asserting that the 
international human rights system imposes international legal obligations on states 
to uphold the land rights of indigenous peoples). 
 36. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). So far, only 
twenty-two states have ratified this convention. See NORMLEX, ILO, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). See 
generally Athanasios Yupsanis, ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 1989–2009: An Overview, 79 
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 433 (2010) (discussing the impact of ILO Convention 169 in 
the first twenty years after its adoption). 
 37. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 36, art. 13(1). 
 38. Anaya & Williams, supra note 35, at 33, 80–81 (discussing the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee’s assertion that governments have a positive 
obligation to protect indigenous peoples’ lands and cultures). 
 39. Working Group to Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Meeting of the Working Group on the Fifth Section of the 
Draft Declaration with a Special Emphasis on “Traditional Forms of Ownership 
and Cultural Survival, Right to Land and Territories,” OEA/Ser.K/XVI,GT/ 
DADIN/doc.113/03 rev. 1 (Nov. 7−8, 2003), at 3. 
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“over the lands which they traditionally occupy.”40 Anaya notes that: 
[U]se of the words “traditionally occupy” in article 14(1), as opposed to 
use of the past tense “occupied”, suggests that the occupancy must be 
connected with the present in order for it to give rise to possessory 
rights . . . . [H]owever, a sufficient contemporary connection with lost 
land may be established by a continuing cultural attachment to them, 
particularly if dispossession occurred recently.41  
In contrast, Article 26(1) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right 
to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally 
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”42 Therefore, 
occupancy of the territory must be connected with the past, and not 
necessarily also with the present. In other words, peoples who were 
forced out of their traditional territories and now live in other areas 
may also be able to exercise their rights.43  
In addition, states have obligations to protect the right of peoples 
to own and possess the land they traditionally use.44 In this context, 
Article 2(2)(b) of ILO Convention 169 obliges states to “promot[e] 
the full realization of the social, economic and cultural rights of these 
[indigenous] peoples with respect for their social and cultural 
identity, their customs and traditions and their institutions.”45 The 
African Overview Report emphasizes the importance of this 
provision, as “land rights recognised in post-colonial countries often 
do not give recognition to indigenous peoples’ traditions, customs 
 
 40. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 36, art. 14(1). 
 41. S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The 
Move Toward the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 40 (2004); 
see also Geir Ulfstein, Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Land, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L LAW, http://www.mpepil.com/, at 18–19 (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2013) (defining the term “traditionally occupy” and its significance to 
indigenous peoples’ exercise of control over the land). 
 42. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 12, art. 26(1). 
 43. See, e.g., S. James Anaya, Maya Aboriginal Land and Resource Rights and 
the Conflict over Logging in Southern Belize, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 17, 
19 (1998) (arguing that the Maya continue to possess rights over their historically 
occupied land despite government concessions to logging companies). 
 44. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 36, art. 14. 
 45. Id. art. 2(2)(b). 
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and concepts of ownership.”46 In this way, Article 14(1) of ILO 
Convention 169 notes that measures must be employed:  
to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not 
exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had 
access for their subsistence and traditional activities. Particular attention 
shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators 
in this respect.47  
The strong wording of Article 14 is somewhat undermined by 
Article 16, which initially notes that “the peoples concerned shall 
not be removed from the lands which they occupy,” but “[w]here the 
relocation of these peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional 
measure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and 
informed consent.”48 Once the reason for the relocation disappears, 
ILO Convention 169 recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to 
return to their traditional lands “[w]henever possible . . . as soon as 
the grounds for relocation cease to exist.”49 However, Article 26 of 
the UN Declaration provides that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the 
right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and 
resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or 
other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have 
otherwise acquired.”50 Furthermore, states are obliged to “give legal 
recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. 
Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the 
customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous 
peoples concerned.”51 In short, states are obliged to observe 
 
 46. ILO, OVERVIEW REPORT OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION AND THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE 
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN 24 AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
88 (2009) [hereinafter ILO/ACHPR], available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/ 
groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_115929.pdf. 
 47. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 36, art. 14(1). In this regard, states “shall take steps as 
necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, 
and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession.” 
Id. art. 14(2). 
 48. Id. art. 16. 
 49. Id. art. 16(3). 
 50. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 12, art. 26(2). 
 51. Id. art. 26(3). 
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indigenous land rights.  
Article 16 of ILO Convention 169 addresses the displacement of 
indigenous peoples.52 Article 16(2) notes that “relocation shall take 
place only following appropriate procedures established by national 
laws and regulations, including public inquiries where 
appropriate . . . .”53 Article 16(4) covers situations where return is not 
possible and imposes compulsory obligations upon states that they 
provide indigenous peoples “in all possible cases with lands of 
quality and legal status at least equal to that of the lands previously 
occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and 
future development.”54 It seems that the Convention only allows for 
displacement of indigenous peoples in exceptional circumstances. 
Finally, paragraph 5 of Article 16 provides for an individual right 
that “[p]ersons thus relocated shall be fully compensated for any 
resulting loss or injury.”55  
Article 15(1) regulates access to the natural resources on 
indigenous territories. It states that the “rights of the peoples 
concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be 
specially safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples 
to participate in the use, management, and conservation of these 
resources.”56 Article 15(2) provides for the right of participation of 
indigenous people in decision-making relating to the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources.57 Article 17 regulates the autonomy 
of procedures of indigenous lands among indigenous peoples 
themselves.58  
Indigenous land rights, therefore, arise from several binding and 
 
 52. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 36, art. 16. 
 53. Id. art. 16(2). 
 54. Id. art. 16(4). 
 55. Id. art. 16(5). 
 56. Id. art. 15(1). 
 57. Id. art. 15(2). See generally James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples’ 
Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions About Natural Resource Extraction: 
The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands 
and Resources, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7 (2005) (arguing that the extent to 
which indigenous peoples must be consulted is a function of their rights to the land 
and resources in question). 
 58. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 36, art. 17. 
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non-binding international human rights documents. Further, some 
argue that indigenous land rights follow from customary 
international law.59 For instance, the Belize Supreme Court Justice A. 
O. Conteh noted that “[t]reaty obligations aside, it is my considered 
view that both customary international law and general principles of 
international law would require that Belize respect the rights of its 
indigenous people to their lands and resources.”60  
It is clear from this analysis of international documents that a 
number of sources in international human rights law provide for state 
obligations with regard to indigenous land rights. However, it must 
be recognized that the protection of indigenous land rights is much 
shallower than the protection of the individual in international human 
rights law, as most state obligations in this field are soft-law 
obligations. By examining national systems, the next section will 
show existing state practice and opinio juris to observe indigenous 
land rights. 
B. NATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 
National legal orders provide an additional layer of support for the 
rights of indigenous people to their traditional lands. A number of 
constitutions and national laws provide for indigenous land rights.61 
The Constitution of Paraguay expressly recognizes the existence of 
indigenous (Indian) peoples, defined as “ethnic groups whose culture 
existed before the formation and constitution of the State of 
Paraguay.”62 The right of indigenous people to their lands is 
recognized in the first paragraph of Article 64, which provides that 
“Indian peoples have the right, as communities, to a shared 
ownership of a piece of land, which will be sufficient both in terms 
of size and quality for them to preserve and to develop their own 
 
 59. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 35, at 54–55 (asserting that emerging 
customary international law indicates that states must protect indigenous land 
rights according to traditional land use and occupancy patterns). 
 60. Aurelio Cal v. Attorney General of Belize, (2007) Judgement, Oct. 18, 
2007, para. 127 (Belize). 
 61. See, e.g., Ley No. 3760, Gaceta Oficial No. 3039 (Nov. 7, 2007) (Bol.) 
(incorporating the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
into Bolivian national law). 
 62. CONSTITUTION OF PARAGUAY, art. 62, translated at http://www.servat 
.unibe.ch/icl/pa00000_.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
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lifestyles.”63 Moreover, Article 64(1) obliges Paraguay to “provide 
them with the respective land, free of charge. This land, which will 
be exempt from attachments, cannot be divided, transferred, or 
affected by the statute of limitations, nor can it be used as collateral 
for contractual obligations or to be leased. It will also be exempt 
from taxes.”64 Paragraph 2 of Article 64 deals with relocation and 
prohibits the “removal or transfer of Indian groups from their habitat, 
without their express consent . . . .”65  
A number of domestic courts in Latin America have protected the 
rights of indigenous peoples by referring to ILO Convention 169.66 
Furthermore, Bolivia has made the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People binding in domestic law.67 The national legal 
orders of the Philippines and Thailand also protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples to their land.68 More specifically, Chapter III of 
the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of the Republic of the 
Philippines protects indigenous rights to ancestral domains.69 
Chigovera notes that, “[d]espite the absence of specific legal 
provisions for the protection of the rights of indigenous people, the 
Namibia government maintains that the Constitution of Namibia 
provides a legislative and normative framework for the protection of 
indigenous minorities.”70  
 
 63. Id. art. 64(1). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. art. 64(2); see also Rainer Grote, The Status and Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in Latin America, 59 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 497, 509 (1999) (“[T]he 
constitutions of Paraguay and Ecuador deal with indigenous rights in the context of 
fundamental rights by recognizing them as collective rights enjoyed by particular 
sectors of society.”). 
 66. See ILO, APPLICATION OF CONVENTION NO. 169 BY DOMESTIC  
AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASEBOOK (2009), available 
at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/ 
publication/wcms_123946.pdf (summarizing relevant judicial decisions from ten 
Latin American countries and concluding that ILO Convention 169 has had a great 
impact on the region). 
 67. Ley No. 3760, Gaceta Oficial No. 3039 (Nov. 7, 2007) (Bol.). 
 68. Cf. Xanthaki, supra note 7, at 472, 476 (noting, however, that in Thailand, 
individual ownership is protected instead of collective ownership, which may 
weaken indigenous rights). 
 69. Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, §§ 4—12 (Act No. 8371) (1997) (Phil.), 
translated at http://www.chanrobles.com/republicactno8371.htm. 
 70. ANDRE CHIGOVERA, ILO, EXAMINING CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE  
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS CONCERNING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN NAMIBIA 
15, http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/indigenous/country_reports/Country_reports_ 
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Several African countries provide for individual and collective 
rights to the property of indigenous peoples in their national 
constitutional frameworks. However, these systems lack an explicit 
normative basis in national legal systems for the rights of indigenous 
peoples to their ancestral land.71 Article 29 of the Constitution of 
Rwanda states that “[p]rivate property, whether individually or 
collectively owned, is inviolable.”72 A similar provision can be found 
in the land laws of other African countries such as Chad, Egypt, the 
Republic of Congo, South Africa, and Uganda.73 This lack of a 
normative basis is common to most African countries.74 However, 
the rights of indigenous people to their ancestral lands in African 
national legal orders also derive from customary law, which forms an 
important part of African national legal systems.75 Further, the 
African Overview Report notes that, “in almost all countries in the 
Central African region, the customary laws of the Bantu population 
are different to those of the ‘Pygmy’ peoples, as the latter’s 
traditional territories comprise large areas of land or territories upon 
 
Namibia.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
 71. See ILO/ACHPR, supra note 46, at 87–94 (explaining that, in post-colonial 
Africa, the shift from collective land ownership to a more individualistic property 
regime led to large-scale dispossession of lands previously defined under 
customary law as belonging to the indigenous peoples traditionally occupying 
them). 
 72. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, May 26, 2003, art. 29. 
 73. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD, Mar. 31, 1996, art. 41 
(holding that the right to property is inviolable and “sacred”); CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO (Congo-Brazzaville) Mar. 15, 1992, art. 30 (guaranteeing 
the right to property and permitting property transfers and expropriations only 
“under the condition of a just and proper indemnification”); S. AFR. CONST., 1996, 
art. 25 (prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of property, even pursuant to 
legislation, and allowing expropriation for public purposes and when subject to 
compensation); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, Oct. 8, 1995, art. 26 
(stipulating that every person has a right to own property “either individually or in 
association with others”); DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF 
EGYPT, Dec. 26, 2012, art. 27 (prohibiting public confiscation of property and 
permitting private confiscation solely pursuant to court order). 
 74. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, May 26, 2003, art. 
29 (providing citizens generally with an inviolable right to property, yet failing to 
expressly provide indigenous peoples in the country with a right to ancestral 
lands). 
 75. See ILO/ACHPR, supra note 46, at 100–14 (identifying various “entry 
points” offered by national laws for indigenous peoples to assert customary land 
right claims, and providing the Democratic Republic of Congo as an example). 
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which they practice hunting, gathering, fishing and other activities.76 
These lands are considered the common property of the community 
as a whole.”77 Customary indigenous land law therefore forms an 
important part of the national legal orders of African countries.  
In addition, the national legal order of New Zealand provides for 
indigenous land rights.78 Furthermore, Australian courts have 
recognized indigenous land rights in several cases.79 Similarly, courts 
in Japan,80 South Africa,81 Kenya,82 Peru,83 the Philippines,84 and 
 
 76. Id. at 101 (noting that, similarly, the Mbororo people of Central and 
Western Africa treat grazing areas as communally owned lands, in contrast to 
mainstream society’s concepts of individualized property ownership and land use). 
 77. Id. (explaining that, in cultures like those of the Pygmy and Mbororo 
peoples, it is almost “unthinkable” for one individual or family to claim an area of 
common property for their exclusive use). 
 78. See, e.g., S.M. Stevenson, Indigenous Land Rights and the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Implications for Maori Land Claims in New 
Zealand, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 298, 319 (2008) (stating that the Maori Land Act 
of 1993 at least officially recognizes the existence of Maori customary title when 
land is held in accordance with Maori customary traditions and values). 
 79. See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.) (holding that 
the Meriam people are entitled to the possession, occupation, use, and enjoyment 
of Australia’s Murray Islands); Mabo v. Queensland, (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186 
(Austl.) (affirming the Meriam people’s demurrer to prevent the Queensland 
government from applying the invalidated Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory 
Act 1985, which was passed to abolish native land title rights). 
 80. See, e.g., Kayano et al. v. Hokkaido Expropriation Comm., 38 I.L.M. 397 
(1999) (Japan) (holding that Japan was obligated under international law to 
recognize the Ainu as an indigenous people); J. Gilbert, Historical Indigenous 
Peoples’ Land Claims: A Comparative and International Approach to the Common 
Law Doctrine on Indigenous Title, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 583 (2007). 
 81. See, e.g., Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty., (2003) C.C.T. 19/03 (S. Afr.) 
(finding that the dispossession of ancestral lands belonging to the Richtersveld 
community pursuant to the Precious Stones Act of 1927 and other state actions was 
racially discriminatory). 
 82. See, e.g., Lemeiguran v. Att’y Gen., (2006) I.L.D.C. 698 (Kenya), available 
at http://www.oxfordlawreports.com/sample_article?id=/oril/Cases/law-ildc-
698ke06&recno=1& (affirming the right of minority groups to “participate 
effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life”). 
 83. See, e.g., Jaime Hans Bustamante Johnson, (2009) EXP. No. 03343-2007-
PA/TC (Peru) (halting oil exploration activities in the protected Cordillera Escalera 
mountains because the oil development threatened the indigenous plaintiffs’ right 
to enjoy their environment). 
 84. See, e.g., Isagani Cruz v. Sec. of Env’t & Natural Res., (2000) G.R. No. 
135385 (Phil.) (conceding that indigenous peoples should have “priority in the use, 
the enjoyment and the preservation of their ancestral lands and domains [but 
refusing to grant to them] perpetual ownership and control of the nation’s 
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Malaysia85 have in unique judicial dialogue reaffirmed indigenous 
ancestral land rights. What is more, Section 5 of the Norwegian 
Finnmark Act notes that, “[t]hrough prolonged use of land and water 
areas, the Sami have collectively and individually acquired rights to 
land in Finnmark.”86 
It is clear from this analysis of national legal orders that a number 
of sources of law in national legal orders recognize the right of 
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands. It appears there is 
growing support for the notion that indigenous land rights can be 
derived from customary law and constitutional and normative 
protections.87 States are therefore obliged to comply with the national 
constitutional and legislative protections of indigenous land rights.88 
Indigenous land rights have been backed by a number of national 
legal orders in Europe, Africa, the Americas, and Asia.89 State 
obligations concerning indigenous land rights derive from national 
 
substantial wealth . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
 85. See, e.g., Sagong Tasi v. Negeri Kerajaan Selangor, (2002) 2 C.L.J. 543 
(Malay.) (recognizing the Temuan-Orang Asli people as customary owners of land 
from which they had been forcibly evicted by police, and ordering the state to 
compensate financially the plaintiff community). 
 86. Act Relating to Legal Relations and Management of Land and Natural 
Resources in the County of Finnmark (No. 85, June 17, 2005) (Fin.). With respect 
to Russia, see Malgosia Fitzmaurice Lachs, Practical Implementation of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights: A Case Study of the Russian Federation 
(Comparison with Certain Developments in Africa in Relation to Indigenous 
Peoples), 3 Y.B. POLAR L. 389 (2011) (assessing the contemporary legal 
framework for indigenous rights protection in Russia and calling on the need for 
better implementation of existing sources of indigenous law in the country, such as 
ILO Convention 169). 
 87. See Lillian Aponte Miranda, Uploading the Local: Assessing the 
Contemporary Relationship Between Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure Systems 
and International Human Rights Law Regarding the Allocation of Traditional 
Lands and Resources in Latin America, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 419, 430 (2008) 
(arguing that several indigenous land rights arise from customary international law, 
such as the right to the use, enjoyment, control, and development of ancestral lands 
and resources irrespective of formal title). 
 88. See generally ILO/ACHPR, supra note 46 (studying the constitutional, 
legislative, and administrative bases for indigenous rights protection in twenty-four 
African countries). 
 89. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 173 (Aug. 31, 2001) (finding Nicaragua had 
violated the American Convention on Human Rights granting private logging 
concessions on lands traditionally used and occupied by the indigenous Awas 
Tingni people). 
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legal orders and from the international level.90 Having gained an 
understanding of indigenous land rights deriving from national legal 
orders, the next part turns to the scope and nature of state obligations 
to observe indigenous land rights.  
IV. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF INDIGENOUS 
RIGHTS TO TRADITIONAL ANCESTRAL LANDS 
This section examines the nature and scope of indigenous land 
rights. It first examines their collective nature and thereafter moves 
to tripartite state obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the human 
rights of indigenous people to their ancestral lands.  
A. THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS 
International human rights law traditionally regulates the rights of 
the individual as a victim of a human rights violation, and human 
rights are usually construed in the relationship of the individual with 
the state or, more recently, with non-state actors. However, in some 
circumstances it is necessary to protect the rights of individuals as a 
group, particularly relating to characteristics that are better protected 
on the group level, such as common history, identity, customs, 
tradition, language, education, land, participation, and self-
governance.91 In such circumstances, the voices of individuals as a 
group are heard much louder than the voice of a lone individual. 
Indigenous peoples as a group are also much stronger negotiating 
partners with states and international organizations.92 However, 
indigenous peoples’ rights are not only collective but also individual 
 
 90. See also Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Evolution of International Indigenous 
Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 281, 304 
(2006) (explaining that, in OAS states, the Inter-American system will interpret the 
American Convention on Human Rights to protect indigenous land rights even in 
the absence of domestic recognition of such rights). 
 91. See Cindy L. Holder & Jeff J. Corntassel, Indigenous Peoples and 
Multicultural Citizenship: Bridging Collective and Individual Rights, 24 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 126, 126–27 (2002) (noting that those for whom such communal life is 
“vital” are not adequately protected by human rights instruments guaranteeing 
rights solely to “persons” and “populations,” as opposed to “peoples”). 
 92. See, e.g., Rima Wilkes et al., Packaging Protest: Media Coverage of 
Indigenous People’s Collective Action, 47 CANADIAN REV. SOC. 327, 328–30 
(2010) (attributing the success of indigenous peoples in Canada in affecting 
significant legal and policy reforms to the tendency of collective action to draw 
media attention and influence public opinion). 
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because they belong also to every individual member of an 
indigenous people.93 Customary rules and traditions have regulated 
the division of property in indigenous societies. Such societies have 
not known or recognized individual human rights to property. 
Property was more a common matter.  
In other words, some rights of individuals are far better protected 
when they are advocated as a group. In this context, Alfredsson aptly 
notes that “[i]f group rights are rejected and preferential treatment 
denied, discriminatory patterns will persist and the equal enjoyment 
of human rights by minorities will never be realized.”94 The Inter-
American Court noted very clearly in Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua that: 
Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition regarding a 
communal form of collective property of the land, in the sense that 
ownership of land in not centered on an individual but rather on the group 
and its community. Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence, 
have the right to live freely in their own territory . . . .95  
Indigenous land rights are therefore group rights and collective in 
nature. They belong to indigenous peoples as a group.96 Anaya and 
Williams note that “among indigenous communities a group’s 
particular system of land tenure is recognized as embodying a 
property rights regime. Within the corresponding system of 
indigenous peoples’ customary norms, traditional land tenure 
generally is understood as establishing the collective property of the 
 
 93. See Holder & Corntassel, supra note 91, at 128–29 (explaining that many 
indigenous peoples stress the interdependence between collective and individual 
rights claims, seeking “dual-standing rights,” which may be invoked both by the 
group and by the individual). 
 94. G. ALFREDSSON, INSTITUTIONAL TRENDS – MINORITY RIGHTS  
20, http://www.wcl.american.edu/humright/hracademy/documents/Class2-Reading 
3MinorityRightsNormsandInstitutions.pdf?rd=1 (last visited Feb. 27, 2013) 
(emphasizing the importance of allowing individuals to “draw on the strength of 
their groups” to realize a broad array of rights, including cultural, educational, 
political, and land-related rights). 
 95. Id. (recognizing the importance of ancestral lands to the spiritual, cultural, 
and economic survival of entire indigenous groups). 
 96. See Lee Swepston & Roger Plant, International Standards and the 
Protection of the Land Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Populations, 124 INT’L 
LAB. REV. 91, 95 (1985) (explaining that, while the nineteenth century witnessed 
the abolition of many communal systems of land management, more recent legal 
reforms have begun to recognize indigenous peoples’ collective claims to land). 
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indigenous community and derivative rights among community 
members.”97 Another important characteristic is that indigenous land 
rights are not static but may change over time as indigenous peoples’ 
culture and use of land changes. Indigenous peoples’ traditional 
possession of their land can be proven by objective facts such as their 
practices and in law by expert opinions by academics or 
practitioners. All in all, indigenous peoples enjoy collective rights 
over territory they connect with physically, emotionally, 
economically, culturally, socially, and spiritually.98  
B. TRIPARTITE STATE OBLIGATIONS TO OBSERVE  
INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS 
This section examines the nature and scope of states’ obligations 
concerning indigenous land rights. It first examines a tripartite 
typology of human rights obligations. The tripartite obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfill indigenous human rights apply 
universally to all rights and entail a combination of negative and 
positive duties.99 This tripartite typology of human rights obligations 
refers, under traditional human rights doctrines, to state 
obligations.100 However, the fact that the state is the bearer of human 
 
 97. Id. (noting that modern tribal courts in the United States tend to emphasize 
the sui generis nature of traditional indigenous land use practices). 
 98. See Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 12.465, ¶ 146 (June 27, 
2002) (interpreting Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
which guarantees the right to property to protect indigenous peoples’ material, 
social, economic, and cultural interests in their lands). 
 99. See generally African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Decision Regarding Communication 155/96 (Social and Economic Rights Action 
Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria), ¶ 44, 
ACHPR/COMM/AO44/1 (May 17, 2002) (reporting that the Commission 
interpreted the African Charter for Human and Peoples’ Rights and developed a 
four-fold typology of human rights obligations in the case of Social and Economic 
Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, 
(Communication 155/96, May 27, 2002)). The Commission held that 
“internationally accepted ideas of the various obligations engendered by human 
rights indicate that all rights — both civil and political rights and social and 
economic — generate at least four levels of duties for a State that undertakes to 
adhere to a rights regime, namely the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil 
these rights.” Id. 
 100. See Int’l Comm’n of Jurists (I.C.J.), Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at 6 (Jan. 26, 1997), available at 
http://www.uu.nl/faculty/leg/NL/organisatie/departementen/departementrechtsgele
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rights obligations does not imply that only the state has such 
obligations.101 Shue notes in this regard that “for every basic right — 
and many other rights as well — there are three types of duties, all of 
which must be performed if the basic right is to be fully honoured 
but not all of which must necessarily be performed by the same 
individuals or institutions.”102  
State tripartite obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill also apply 
to questions of indigenous land rights.103 The indigenous rights to 
 
erdheid/organisatie/onderdelen/studieeninformatiecentrummensenrechten/publicati
es/simspecials/20/Documents/20-01.pdf (requiring states responsible for violating 
international legal obligations to establish mechanisms for investigating, 
prosecuting, and correcting such violations); U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 
11), para. 15 (May 12, 1999) (explaining that the obligation to “respect” imposes 
on states a duty not to take any measures that in any way deprive protected parties 
of the right concerned); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, 
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 52 (1980) (observing the tripartite typology of duties to 
include (1) duties to avoid the deprivation of the right concerned, (2) duties to 
protect rights holders from deprivation, and (3) duties to aid rights holders who 
have been deprived). 
 101. See, e.g., ALLAN ROSAS & MARTIN SCHEININ, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 57–58 (Raija 
Hanski & Markku Suksi eds., 2d ed. 2004) (contending that in the Human Rights 
Committee’s review of a land claim case concerning Finnish Sami, the Committee 
seemed to imply that activities interfering with an indigenous people’s use and 
enjoyment of their land may constitute a violation of the people’s cultural rights 
even when carried out by private, non-state parties). But see id. (noting the general 
reluctance to the express recognition of human rights obligations). 
 102. SHUE, supra note 100, at 76; see also Asbjǿrn Eide, Realization of Social 
and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold Approach, 10 HUM. RTS. L.J. 
35, 37 (1989) (arguing that the tripartite typology of duties bestows on states a 
negative obligation to abstain from acts contrary to human rights principles and a 
positive obligation as a “protector and provider” of rights). 
 103. See The Right to Adequate Food and to Be Free from Hunger – Updated 
Study on the Right to Food, Economic & Social Counsel, ¶¶ 65, 75, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12 (June 28, 1999) (by Asbjørn Eide) (reporting the 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ finding that in the case of 
Guatemala, the issue of land ownership and distribution was essential to assessing 
indigenous and rural populations’ social, cultural, and economic grievances); 
OLIVER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, 
COMMENTARY 232–53 (2010); ROSAS & SCHEININ, supra note 101, at 49–62 
(observing that unlike most human rights obligations, which create a vertical 
relationship between the state and the individual rights holder, the collective rights 
of indigenous peoples and other minorities create a “horizonal effect”); 
MAGDALENA SEPULVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 157 
  
1150 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:4 
enjoy ancestral lands create state obligations to respect, protect, and 
fulfill those rights.104 Their rights are accompanied with corollary 
obligations of the state to secure the peaceful enjoyment of their 
lands.105 Anaya and Williams note that “passive neglect on the part of 
states in not demarcating or otherwise securing indigenous peoples’ 
lands is frequently accompanied by active affronts to the connections 
that indigenous peoples seek to maintain with lands and natural 
resources.”106 As states are often reluctant to recognize and protect 
indigenous rights to their ancestral lands, it is necessary to map out 
the nature and scope of states’ obligations.  
In this context, Anaya and Williams distinguish two major types 
of legal obligations relating to indigenous lands: “the obligation of 
states to adopt adequate measures to specifically identify and secure 
indigenous peoples’ communal lands” and “state obligations with 
respect to natural resource or other development initiatives affecting 
indigenous lands.”107 Such a division of state obligations is helpful; 
however, rather than relying on such a framework, it is more useful 
to rely on indigenous rights within the tripartite framework of state 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill.108  
 
(2003) (arguing that all human rights, whether civil and political in nature or 
economic, social, and cultural, impose a broad array of duties). 
 104. See Eide, supra note 102, at 37 (arguing that these obligations comprise the 
three levels of state responsibility for all human rights). 
 105. See, e.g., Pasqualucci, supra note 8, at 61–63 (describing how Nicaragua 
finally implemented indigenous land right protections in response to pressure from 
both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the World Bank). 
 106. Anaya & Williams, supra note 35, at 77. 
 107. Id. at 77; see also Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous 
Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 57, 87 (1999) (stating that the Guatemalan Constitution even obligates the 
state to provide lands to indigenous communities that need them for their 
development); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of 
International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Survival in the World, 660 DUKE L.J. 660, 664 (1990) (observing that, at the time 
the article was written, the international order did not contest domestic legal 
regimes that limited or completely denied indigenous peoples their collective 
rights). 
 108. See Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1084, 1090, principle 3 (2012) (asserting that the 
obligation of states to respect, protect, and fulfill all human rights applies both 
domestically and extraterritorially). 
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States have obligations to ensure indigenous peoples’ enjoyment 
of land rights. The bulk of this section therefore concentrates on 
states’ substantive obligations to regulate and adjudicate indigenous 
land rights. States have in the past often neglected their obligation to 
observe indigenous rights, including land rights.109 The lowest 
common denominator of state obligations is now clear. The Outcome 
Statement of the 2005 World Summit established that “[e]ach 
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.”110 The Outcome Statement thus clarifies that “[t]his 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.”111 Such 
wording was later taken up by Article 7 of the UN Declaration and 
made stronger in Article 8, which notes that “[i]ndigenous peoples 
and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced 
assimilation or destruction of their culture.”112 
C. THE OBLIGATION OF STATES TO RESPECT 
States’ obligations to respect indigenous land rights obliges states 
to refrain from interfering in the enjoyment of indigenous land 
rights.113 This rule derives from the ancient Roman principle sic utere 
tuo ut alterum non laedes.114 According to Eide, the obligation to 
respect: 
 
 109. See, e.g., Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/1I. 117, doc.1 rev. 1 (2003) (arising as a result of use 
restrictions imposed by the United States on Western Shoshone traditional lands). 
 110. 2005 World Summit Outcome Resolution, G.A. Res 60, UN 
Doc.A/Res60/L., ¶ 138 (Sept. 15, 2005). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 12, art. 8. 
 113. See Int’l Hum. Rts. Instruments, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 158, ¶ 7, 
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (May 12, 1994) [hereinafter Int’l Hum. Rts. 
Instruments] (extending the scope of protection beyond property to include culture 
and traditional activities like hunting and fishing). 
 114. See Elizabeth E. Ruddick, Note, The Continuing Constraint of Sovereignty: 
International Law, International Protection, and the Internally Displaced, 77 B.U. 
L. REV. 429, 471 n.231 (1997) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines the 
term as requiring one to use his or her own property “in such a manner as not to 
injure that of another”). The author also points out that this principle has become a 
widely accepted term in environmental law. See id. at 470–71. 
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[R]equires the State, and thereby all its organs and agents, to abstain from 
doing anything that violates the integrity of the individual or infringes on 
her or his freedom, including the freedom to use the material resources 
available to that individual in the ways she or he finds best to satisfy the 
basic needs.115  
This obligation to respect also obliges the state to effectively 
recognize indigenous peoples’ right to participation in all matters 
concerning them.116 The obligation to respect may appear to suggest 
that states must undertake due diligence ensuring not only that they 
comply with human rights obligations concerning indigenous land 
rights, but also that they do everything possible to avoid causing 
harm to indigenous land rights.117 For instance, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted in its concluding 
observations on Finland that the country needs to “find an adequate 
solution to the question of ownership and use of land in the Sami 
home-land in close consultations with all parties concerned, 
including the Sami Parliament, and then to ratify ILO Convention 
No. 169 . . . as a matter of priority.”118 A state’s obligation to respect 
 
 115. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., The Right to Adequate 
Food, at 67, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet 
34en.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
 116. See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 36, art. 6(1) (requiring states parties to consult indigenous 
peoples before undertaking any legislative or administrative measures that might 
affect them, and to ensure indigenous peoples’ participation in the decision-making 
processes surrounding such measures); United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 12, art. 18 (providing that indigenous peoples 
have the right to participate in decision-making in matters affecting their rights 
through their own representatives and decision-making institutions); Anaya & 
Williams, supra note 35, at 78–81 (arguing that, in addition to property rights, 
indigenous peoples have the right to be consulted on any decision affecting their 
lands and interests, as well as the right to freely pursue their political, economic, 
social, and cultural development); Pasqualucci, supra note 8, at 86–91 (noting that 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recognized the obligation of states 
to consult indigenous peoples with the purpose of receiving their “free, prior, and 
informed consent” on any proposed activity that may potentially affect the 
existence, value, use, or enjoyment of their lands and resources). 
 117. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/1I. 117, doc.1 rev. 1 (2003) (holding that international law 
obligates states to adopt special measures to guard indigenous peoples against 
dispossession of their land claims). 
 118. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 
17 of the Covenant, Economic and Social Counsel, ¶ 20, UN Doc. 
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therefore includes obligations not only to recognize indigenous land 
rights, but also to demarcate them.119  
Such an obligation to recognize and demarcate also follows from 
the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.120 For 
instance, that court recognized in Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua the 
rights of indigenous people to their traditional territories by stating 
that “[i]ndigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence, have 
the right to live freely in their own territory; the close ties of 
indigenous people with the land must be recognized and understood 
as the fundamental basis of their culture, their spiritual life, integrity, 
and their economic survival.”121 
The UN Declaration provides in Article 26(1) that “States shall 
give legal recognition to land, territories and resources.”122 The third 
paragraph of Article 26 thereafter notes that “[s]tates shall give legal 
recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. 
Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, 
traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples 
concerned.”123 The measures that states can adopt to ensure respect 
 
E/C.12/FIN/CO/5 (Jan. 16, 2008) (calling on Finland also to ensure that logging 
and other activities carried out by private actors on Sami land do not negatively 
interfere with the Sami’s economic, cultural, and social rights). 
 119. See Pasqualucci, supra note 8, at 61–63 (stating that international courts 
and organizations like the World Bank alike have recognized the duty of states to 
demarcate indigenous and tribal lands); see also Anaya & Williams, supra note 35, 
at 75–77 (noting that failure to properly demarcate indigenous lands can leave the 
lands vulnerable to encroachment by outsiders, including the state itself). 
 120. Pasqualucci, supra note 8, at 61–63 (citing Awas Tingni Cmty. v. 
Nicaragua, a case that arose when the government of Nicaragua granted logging 
concessions on land traditionally used and occupied by the Awas Tingni, an 
indigenous group that at the time lacked deed or title to their long-possessed 
territory). 
 121. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001); see also Leonardo J. Alvarado, 
Prospects and Challenges in the Implementation of Indigenous Peoples’ Human 
Rights in International Law: Lessons from the Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 
24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 609, 623–24 (2007) (explaining that the Nicaraguan 
government responded to the Awas Tingni ruling and subsequent pressure from the 
World Bank by passing Law 445, which ordered the state to adopt specific 
legislative and administrative mechanisms for demarcating indigenous lands in the 
country’s Atlantic Coastal area). 
 122. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 12, art. 26(1). 
 123. Id. 
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for the indigenous land rights include acknowledging the indigenous 
land rights in national legislation, constantly and consistently 
examining human rights situations where indigenous land rights are 
at stake, effectively monitoring policies that protect the human rights 
of indigenous peoples, and implementing an effective monitoring 
system to ensure that human rights policies relating to indigenous 
land rights are being implemented.124 Furthermore, the state should 
also not interfere with the indigenous land tenure system and should 
recognize it as equal to the modern system based on the right to 
property.125 States are also obliged to prevent and investigate 
violations, bring to justice and punish the perpetrators, and provide 
reparations for harm and injuries caused.126 The next section 
discusses the obligation of states to protect indigenous land rights.  
D. THE OBLIGATION OF STATES TO PROTECT  
The obligation of states to protect indigenous peoples’ right to 
their ancestral lands includes protecting the individual and collective 
enjoyment of the indigenous land and employing its resources to 
protect the right to land of individuals as well as indigenous 
communities.127 For instance, the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights note that “[s]tates must take action, separately, 
and jointly through international cooperation, to protect economic, 
social and cultural rights of persons within their territories and 
extraterritorially . . . .”128 A state’s obligation to protect is of a 
 
 124. Id. art. 19 (calling on states to consult indigenous peoples in good faith and 
with the object of securing their free, prior, and informed consent on all 
administrative or legislative measures potentially affecting them). 
 125. See Pasqualucci, supra note 8, at 64–65 (pointing out that while draft 
provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights initially referred only to 
“private property,” the adjective “private” was subsequently dropped, probably 
indicating the Inter-American system’s recognition and acceptance of collective 
property regimes). 
 126. See id. at 70–72 (stating that, within the Inter-American system, the state 
may have a positive obligation to return to indigenous peoples land that was 
involuntarily taken from them). 
 127. See id. at 83–84 (reporting the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s 
observation that a state’s failure to recognize the land rights of an indigenous 
people could both jeopardize the collective survival of the people and interfere 
with the basic rights of individuals within that society). 
 128. THE MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
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positive nature and requires the state to adopt protective measures to 
secure the observance of indigenous land rights.129 Anaya notes that 
such an obligation includes “an ambitious programme of legal and 
policy reform, institutional action and reparations for past wrongs, 
involving a myriad of State actors within their respective spheres of 
competence.”130 Often, large development projects take place on 
indigenous territories. In such cases, states are obliged to ensure that 
development projects do not have adverse impacts on the survival 
and development of indigenous peoples.131 Further, indigenous 
peoples are also entitled to the benefits stemming from development 
projects on their territory.132 This is confirmed by Article 20 of the 
UN Declaration.133  
The obligation to protect is a substantive obligation and a primary 
obligation relating to the conduct of third parties such as rebel groups 
or corporations. States are also obliged to ensure that private actors 
will not violate indigenous land rights.134 In Velásquez Rodríguez v. 
 
STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, principle  
23 (Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter THE MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES], available  
at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/articlesAndTranscripts/2011/MaastrichtEco 
Soc.pdf (further defining the obligation in Principles 24 to 27). 
 129. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 35, at 81–83 (asserting that the duty to 
take “positive steps” toward ensuring indigenous peoples their cultural survival 
requires states to actively adopt policies and systems that incorporate indigenous 
rights protection). 
 130. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, 
Civil , Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development, Human Rights Council, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9 (Aug. 11, 
2008). 
 131. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 35, at 81–83 (arguing that merely 
identifying the economic or environmental impacts of government-sponsored 
activities on indigenous lands and livelihoods is not enough to satisfy the duty—
proactive protective measures are necessary). 
 132. See id. at 83–84 (arguing that benefits derived from economic activities 
carried out on indigenous land should be used to build indigenous peoples’ 
capacity to protect their lands and to pursue their own development agendas). 
 133. See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 12, art. 20 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their 
political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment 
of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all 
their traditional and other economic activities.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 164 (Aug. 31, 2001) (ordering Nicaragua to 
address and prevent any measures that might interfere with the Awas Tingni’s use 
  
1156 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:4 
Honduras, a case concerning the disappearance of Manfredo 
Velasquez, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated: 
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not 
directly imputable to a state (for example, because it is the act of a private 
person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead 
to international responsibility of the state, not because of the act itself, but 
because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond 
to it as required by the Convention.135 
The due diligence standard includes an obligation “to exercise due 
diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused 
by such acts by private persons or entities.”136 In Velasquez, the 
IACHR held Honduras responsible for failing “to take reasonable 
steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its 
disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed 
within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the 
appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate 
compensation.”137 In Herrera Rubio v. Colombia, the HRC 
emphasized the right to take effective measures to remedy 
violations.138 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) held that “the state cannot absolve itself from 
responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies or 
individuals.”139 The state, however, cannot be responsible for every 
indigenous land rights violation by a private party.140 To this end, the 
 
and enjoyment of their ancestral lands, including those carried out by private, third 
parties acting with the state’s authorization or acquiescence). 
 135. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1988). 
 136. Int’l Hum. Rts. Instruments, supra note 113, ¶ 8 (emphasis added). 
 137. Velásquez Rodríguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 174. 
 138. See Herrera Rubio v. Colombia, Communication No. 161/1983, ¶ 12, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1987), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28 
Symbol%29/1333fa547f442b3dc1256abc005163ec?Opendocument (finding the 
basis for the right in article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights). 
 139. Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13134/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
para. 27, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-57804 
?TID=pypndabqmb. 
 140. See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Cost, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 174, ¶ 63 (Nov. 28, 2007) 
(suggesting that, within the Inter-American human rights system, states may be 
held accountable for third-party infringements on indigenous land rights only if the 
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state is only required to have a sufficiently adequate administrative 
and judicial system of preventing and stopping violations of 
indigenous land rights, as well as a system for providing remedies for 
victims of violations instigated by private parties.141 All in all, states 
are obliged to protect the individual and collective enjoyment of the 
indigenous lands. 
E. THE OBLIGATION OF STATES TO FULFILL 
The third category of state obligations concerning indigenous land 
rights includes the obligation to fulfill, which requires the state to 
take active measures to ensure the availability, accessibility, and 
affordability of indigenous land.142 For instance, the Maastricht 
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights note in principle 28 that “[a]ll 
States must take action, separately, and jointly through international 
cooperation, to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights of persons 
within their territories and extraterritorially . . .”143 States are and 
should be primarily responsible to fulfill this obligation. However, a 
rebel group, such as FARC in Colombia, or a corporation, such as 
Royal Dutch Shell in Ogoniland, may become the primary holder of 
an obligation to fulfill indigenous land rights in a failed state where 
there is no governmental control or no efficient authority to protect 
indigenous land rights.144  
A similar situation may occur when corporations operate in 
territories where a state is unable to fulfill the land rights of the 
people living there.145 The size and availability of a state’s financial 
resources will play a large role in meeting these standards to protect 
 
third party was acting with the state’s authorization, acquiescence, or tolerance). 
 141. See Int’l Hum. Rts. Instruments, supra note 113, ¶ 8 (explaining that a 
state’s failure to ensure rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights may amount to a violation by the state of the agreement). 
 142. See generally Economic, Social, and Cultural: Norms on the Responsibility 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 
2003/12/Rev.2, at 4 (2003) (describing the responsibilities and roles that various 
actors, namely transnational companies, play in promoting human rights to 
indigenous people). 
 143. THE MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 128, ¶ 28. 
 144. See id. ¶ 12 (providing that non-state actors are responsible for fulfilling the 
obligations of the state when they are acting in the capacity of the state). 
 145. Id. 
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indigenous rights. While the resources available for fulfilling human 
rights obligations may not be as plentiful in small states as in large 
states, states may adopt such policies to the maximum extent given 
their available resources.146  
This section has attempted to show that states have obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfill indigenous land rights. In sum these 
inherently interconnected levels of obligations mean that states have 
tripartite obligations to observe indigenous land rights. 
V. ENFORCEMENT OF STATE OBLIGATIONS TO 
OBSERVE INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS 
The right to a remedy for victims of human rights violations as an 
individual or group is a tenet of every functioning judicial system. 
The effectiveness of all other rights rests on access to an effective 
legal remedy. This section discusses and analyzes three different 
avenues allowing indigenous people to enforce state obligations 
concerning indigenous land rights. The Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law identify the state’s 
obligation in relation to the due diligence standard.147 The Basic 
Principles suggest that states are required to “[t]ake appropriate 
legislative and administrative and other appropriate measures to 
prevent violations”;148 “investigate violations effectively, promptly, 
thoroughly, impartially and, where appropriate, take action against 
those allegedly responsible in accordance with domestic and 
international law”;149 “provide those who claim to be victims of a 
human rights or humanitarian law violation with equal and effective 
access to justice . . . irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer 
of responsibility for the violation”;150 and “provide effective 
 
 146. See id. ¶ 31 (explaining that states must ensure they strategize and pool all 
available resources to provide economic, cultural, and social rights). 
 147. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines]. 
 148. Id. para. 3(a). 
 149. Id. para. 3(b). 
 150. Id. para. 3(c). 
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remedies to victims, including reparation.”151 Another important 
avenue is to enable indigenous peoples’ participation in vital 
stakeholders forums.152 Taken together, states have an international 
legal obligation to comply with the due diligence standard relating to 
indigenous land rights.153  
This section discusses the enforcement of state obligations to 
observe indigenous land rights. It does so in three steps: discussing 
and analyzing compliance with the views of the UN Human Rights 
Committee, examining the enforcement mechanism under the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and ILO 
Convention No. 169, and examining the monitoring system of the 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 
A. THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(‘ICCPR’) is one of the earliest United Nations’ human rights 
treaties.154 It provides that every victim of a violation of a right in the 
Covenant should have access to an effective remedy, and this should 
include having his or her rights “determined by competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent 
authority provided for by the legal system of the state, and to develop 
the possibilities of judicial remedy.”155 This section examines the 
domestic and international implementation of indigenous peoples’ 
rights. The ICCPR does not directly refer to the rights of indigenous 
 
 151. Id. para. 3(d). 
 152. See Katie Patterson, Overcoming Barriers to Indigenous Peoples’ 
Participation in Forest Carbon Markets, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 417 
(2011) (using case studies to illustrate that, to ensure successful programs, for 
example REDD, indigenous peoples should be engaged throughout the design 
process). 
 153. See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 147 (setting forth 
state roles and responsibilities in tackling international human rights abuses as they 
relate to indigenous peoples); THE MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES, supra note 128 
(same). 
 154. Kristin Ash, U.S. Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, 3 N.W. U. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 36 (2005). 
 155. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2.3(b), Mar. 23, 
1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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peoples, although Article 27 provides for the rights of minorities.156 
However, as Scheinin notes, “[g]roups identifying themselves as 
indigenous peoples generally fall under the protection of Article 27 
as ‘minorities.’”157 The Human Rights Committee recognized 
indigenous land rights in General Comment No. 23 by stating “that 
culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of 
life associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case 
of indigenous peoples.”158 
The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR establishes the right to 
individual communications.159 The Optional Protocol states in the 
preamble that it aims “further to achieve the purposes” of the ICCPR 
by enabling the Human Rights Committee, established in Part IV of 
the ICCPR, “to receive and consider, as provided in the present 
Protocol, communications from individuals claiming to be victims of 
violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.”160 General 
Comment no. 33 notes that “the Optional Protocol sets out a 
procedure, and imposes obligations on States parties to the Optional 
Protocol arising out of that procedure, in addition to their obligations 
under the Covenant.”161 An aggrieved individual can appeal to the 
Human Rights Committee only after having exhausted the process 
for all available domestic remedies.162 The Human Rights Committee 
is thereafter obliged to forward its views to the state party in question 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. MARTIN SCHEININ, NORWEGIAN CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES’ LAND RIGHTS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www.galdu.org/govat/ 
doc/ind_peoples_land_rights.pdf. 
 158. Int’l Hum. Rts. Instruments, supra note 113, ¶ 7. 
 159. See generally Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, http://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-5.en.pdf (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to ICCPR] (detailing how the 
protocol governs individual communications between victims of violations of the 
Covenant and the Committee and the procedures undertaken when complaints are 
registered with the Committee). 
 160. Id. 
 161. The Obligations of States Parties Under the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 33, 
para. 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ 
bodies/hrc/docs/CCPR.C.GC.33.pdf [hereinafter Optional Protocol to ICCPR 
General Comment No. 33]. 
 162. Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 159, art. 5(2)(b). 
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and to the complainant.163  
State Parties are obliged to ensure that individuals and groups can 
invoke the rights under the ICCPR.164 A number of indigenous land 
rights cases have in the past been brought before the Committee 
through the individual communications mechanism.165 For instance, 
the Human Rights Committee noted in Kitok v Sweden, in the context 
of indigenous rights, that “the right to enjoy one’s own culture in 
community with the other members of the group cannot be 
determined in abstracto but has to be placed in context.”166 
However, it remains debatable how effective a mechanism the 
Optional Protocol is for enforcing indigenous land rights. The 
Human Rights Committee is not a judicial body, although its views 
show some “important characteristics of a judicial decision.”167 The 
Human Rights Committee refers to the final outcome of the 
 
 163. Id. art. 5(4). 
 164. Optional Protocol to ICCPR General Comment No. 33, supra note 161. 
 165. See, e.g., Aarela v. Finland, Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 779, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 (Nov. 7, 2001) (concluding that Finland did not 
violate any rights owed to the reindeer herders because it conducted logging 
activities after ample notification and communication to the herders and such 
activities were not extensive enough to destroy the herders livelihood or cultural 
rights to the land); Apirana Mahuika v. New Zealand, Judgments U.N. Admin. 
Trib., No. 547, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/D/70/547/1993 (Oct. 20, 2000) (holding that 
the rights of various Maori tribes in New Zealand, with respect to fisheries, were 
not denied as the result of the enactment of the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Act); 
J.G.A. Diergaardt v. Namibia, Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 760, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/69/D/760/1996 (Sept. 6, 2000) (finding that Namibia violated the rights 
of the indigenous tribes when it denied them access to their land over time through 
various political programs); Jouni Lansman v. Finland, Judgments U.N. Admin. 
Trib., No. 671, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (Nov. 22, 1996) (describing the 
Committee’s finding of a non-breach by Finland in a case brought by reindeer 
breeders of Sami ethnic origin against Finland challenging a plan to construct 
roads within the breeders’ land); Ilmari Lansman v. Finland, Judgments U.N. 
Admin. Trib., No. 511, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Nov. 8, 1994) 
(illustrating the Committee’s finding of a non-breach by Finland in a case brought 
by reindeer breeders against Finland challenging quarrying and transportation of 
stone through their herding territory). 
 166. Kitok v. Sweden, Judgments, Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 197, ¶ 9.3, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (Aug. 10, 1988), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/d9332db8dfce2f63c1256ab500
52d2ff?Opendocument. 
 167. See Optional Protocol to ICCPR General Comment No. 33, supra note 161, 
para. 11. 
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procedure concerning individual communication as decisions.168 The 
Human Rights Committee implicitly opines that its views are 
binding, even though it never explicitly refers to the binding nature 
of its views.169 The Human Rights Committee has so far adopted 
views in 882 cases (with violations found in 731 cases); in addition, 
569 cases were declared inadmissible, 302 discontinued or 
withdrawn, and 323 not yet concluded.170   
Of all communications where the Human Rights Committee found 
violations, it described the follow-up and response of the state party 
as satisfactory in just seven cases or communications.171 Further, the 
Human Rights Committee did not receive any response from the 
state party in 131 cases or communications.172 Such statistics are 
more than alarming, as they cast a deep shadow over the monitoring 
system of the Human Rights Committee, particularly the 
effectiveness of its work and the compliance of states parties with the 
Human Rights Committee’s views. In other words, no response 
means not only that a state party has not implemented the Human 
Rights Committee’s view but also that it has refused to reply to the 
Human Rights Committee’s inquiry in the follow up.  
When no response is at hand, the Human Rights Committee 
considers the process as ongoing with a view to implementation.173 
 
 168. See id. para. 12. 
 169. See id. para. 13 (describing the decisions reached by the Committee as “an 
authoritative determination by the organ established by the Covenant itself charged 
with interpretation of that instrument”). 
 170. See Rep. of the Hum. Rts Comm., Gen. Assembly, on its 6th session, para. 
94(4), U.N. Doc. A/66/40 (providing a detailed background of the Committee’s 
work since its implementation). 
 171. See, e.g., El-Hichou v. Denmark, Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 1554, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C//99/D/1554/2007 (July 22, 2010); Vojonović v. Croatia, 
Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 1510, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1510/2006 
(Apr. 29, 2009); Leirvag v. Norway, Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 1155, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1155/2003 (Nov. 23, 2004); Pauger v. Austria, 
Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 415, at 122, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/44/D/415/1990 
(Mar. 26, 1992); Waldman v. Canada, Judgments U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 694, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996 (Nov. 5, 1999). 
 172. See generally Rep. of the Hum. Rts Comm., supra note 170, annex IV 
(providing a table with various communications divided by states parties with 
details of each decision contained therein). 
 173. See generally Optional Protocol to ICCPR General Comment No. 33, supra 
note 161, para. 16 (describing how the Committee has procedures in place to assist 
member states with implementing its views, namely designating a Special 
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However, it does not provide for any sanction if the state party does 
not participate or comply with the Human Rights Committee’s 
views.174 In addition, General Comment no. 33 is silent on this.175 If a 
state party refuses to implement the Human Rights Committee’s 
views under the Optional Protocol, the Human Rights Committee 
publically publishes such a failure to implement the view.176 If the 
state violates such interim or provisional measures, it directly 
violates the “obligation to respect in good faith the procedure of 
individual communication established under the Optional 
Protocol.”177 It seems this is a major shortcoming in how the Human 
Rights Committee functions, as it lacks real “teeth” to sanction the 
violators of the Optional Protocol and the ICCPR and to provide 
effective redress to the victims of indigenous land rights violations.  
B. THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES AND ILO CONVENTION NO. 169 
The UN Declaration was adopted in 2007 with 143 voting in 
favor, 4 against, and 11 abstaining.178 Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United States voted against its adoption.179 Anaya 
describes the UN Declaration as reflecting “the existing international 
consensus regarding the individual and collective rights of 
indigenous peoples.”180 In this way, it provides “the most 
 
Rapporteur for Follow up of Views who meets with states to persuade them to 
accept the Committee’s views as well as to ascertain and work through any issues 
the state may be facing with such implementation). 
 174. See id. para. 17 (discussing the only reprimand—publication in a public 
record—available to states that fail to implement the Committee’s view). 
 175. See id. (omitting any mention of sanctions or specific punishment to be 
imposed on member states who fail to implement the Committee’s views). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. para. 19. 
 178. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 12, art. 1; see also R.T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: A Historic Change in International Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 
539, 539 (2009); Megan Davis, Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 MELBOURNE J. 
INT’L. L. 439, 440 (2008) (describing the Declaration at the time of its adoption as 
“a non-binding aspirational declaration of the General Assembly”). 
 179. Indigenous Rights Outlined by U.N., B.B.C. NEWS (Sept. 13, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/6993776.stm. 
 180. See Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People, supra note 130, ¶ 43. 
  
1164 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:4 
authoritative expression of this consensus” and established “a 
framework of action towards the full protection and implementation 
of these rights.”181 It seems, however, doubtful to claim that the UN 
Declaration reflects “the existing international consensus” when four 
states with some of the largest indigenous populations voted against 
it.182 Nonetheless, the UN Declaration is clear about the right to 
remedy of indigenous peoples to enforce their rights. Article 27 
obliges states to: 
establish and implement . . . a fair, independent, impartial, open and 
transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, 
history, culture, language, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to 
recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to 
their lands, territories and resources, including those which were 
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used.183  
Further, Article 28(1) establishes the right to compensation for 
occupied or confiscated traditional indigenous territories.184 The state 
has obligations to compensate indigenous peoples with money, land, 
or “other appropriate redress.”185 Some of the monitoring functions 
are performed by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
although the Forum is not a judicial organ but only an advisory organ 
to the UN Economic and Social Council.186 In this way, the UN 
Declaration may be described as lex imperfecta. It is clear, however, 
that soft-law documents do not have the same normative value as 
treaties in international human rights law. They nonetheless provide 
an additional layer from which states’ commitment to observe the 
land rights of indigenous peoples is derived.  
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Coulter, supra note 178, at 545 (noting that the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia voted against the Declaration). 
 183. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra 
note 12, art. 27. 
 184. See id. art. 28(1) (providing indigenous people with restitution as the first 
available remedy, followed by compensation, for land that has been “confiscated, 
taken, occupied, used or damaged” without their consent). 
 185. Id. art. 28(2) (“Unless otherwise agreed upon by the peoples concerned, 
compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in 
quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate 
redress.”). 
 186. Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://social.un.org/index/IndigenousPeoples.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
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ILO Convention 169 provides in Article 14(3) that states are 
obliged to establish adequate procedures “within the national legal 
system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.”187 Anaya 
observes that “Article 14(3) is a response to the historical processes 
that have afflicted indigenous peoples, processes that have trampled 
on their cultural attachment to ancestral lands, disregarded or 
minimized their legitimate property interest, and left them without 
adequate means of subsistence.”188 Even though the Convention has 
only received a handful of ratifications, its impacts have been noted, 
particularly in Latin America. Despite the lack of a robust 
international mechanism within the International Labour 
Organisation (“ILO”),189 recent ILO studies show that national 
legislation and national judicial organs refer to it.190 However, its 
direct value as a mechanism for enforcing indigenous rights still 
remains in doubt. 
All in all, the UN Declaration and the ILO Convention have not 
gained a foothold as a useful tool for enforcing indigenous land 
rights. Even if states are not legally bound by the Declaration, 
reference to it in national legislation would suggest an emerging 
trend that states consider themselves as being bound.  
C. THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights is the 
authoritative regional human rights treaty in the Americas.191 The 
 
 187. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, supra note 36, art. 14(3). 
 188. Anaya, supra note 35, at 40. 
 189. See Anne Trebilcock, ILO, ILO Conventions-Enforcement Procedures, 
http://www.ilo.org/safework_bookshelf/english?content&nd=857170272 (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2013) (discussing how the ILO has contributed to better working 
conditions despite it not being a “police force”). 
 190. See, e.g., ILO, MONITORING INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
THROUGH ILO CONVENTIONS: A COMPILATION OF ILO SUPERVISORY BODIES’ 
COMMENTS (2010), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_126028.pdf (providing detailed 
examples and commentary of how various states interpret and use the ILO 
Convention within their respective countries); APPLICATION OF CONVENTION NO. 
169 BY DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASEBOOK, 
supra note 66 (describing the application of the Convention by various Latin 
American states in making decisions concerning indigenous peoples). 
 191. See American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights are responsible for monitoring state 
compliance with the Convention. Anaya and Williams note that the 
Inter-American Court has “the power to require states that have 
consented to its jurisdiction . . . to take remedial measures for the 
violation of human rights.”192 The Inter-American Court has in past 
decades developed, arguably, the most extensive and evolved case 
law on indigenous peoples’ rights, including their land rights.193  
For instance, the Inter-American Court noted in Awas Tingni v. 
Nicaragua that “indigenous groups, by the fact of their very 
existence, have the right to live freely in their own territory; the close 
ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and 
understood as the fundamental basis of their culture, their spiritual 
life, integrity, and their economic survival.”194 Similarly, the Court 
observed in Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay that 
“disregarding the ancestral right of the members of the indigenous 
communities to their territories could affect other basic rights, such 
as the right to cultural identity and to the very survival of the 
indigenous communities and their members.”195 In contrast, the Court 
noted in the next paragraph that the “restriction of the right of private 
individuals to private property might be necessary to attain the 
collective objective of preserving cultural identities in a democratic 
and pluralist society.”196 In short, right to property is not absolute. In 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the Court noted 
“that indigenous communities might have a collective understanding 
of the concepts of property and possession, in the sense that 
ownership of the land ‘is not centered on an individual but rather on 
the group and its community.’”197 Further, the Court noted that: 
 
123 (detailing the rights that Latin American states are mandated to adopt to “give 
effect to those rights of freedoms”). 
 192. Anaya & Williams, supra note 35, at 38. 
 193. See id. at 38–40 (illustrating examples of notable cases presented to the 
Court including Awas Tingni, which is projected to “establish an important 
precedent on indigenous rights under Inter-American and international law”). 
 194. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 195. Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 127, ¶ 147 (June 17, 2005). 
 196. Id. ¶ 148. 
 197. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty., Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. L) 
No. 12/03, ¶ 120 (Mar. 29, 2006), quoting Mayagna, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
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[T]he fact that they claimed lands are privately held by third parties is not 
in itself an “objective and reasoned” ground for dismissing prima facie 
the claims by the Indigenous people. Otherwise, restitution rights become 
meaningless and would not entail an actual possibility of recovering 
traditional lands, as it would be exclusively limited to an expectation on 
the will of the current holders, forcing indigenous communities to accept 
alternative lands or economic compensations.198  
This means that states also have to protect indigenous land rights in 
relation to third parties. In addition, there is no time restriction on the 
right to restitution.199 
The obligation to respect includes the state’s duty to recognize and 
demarcate indigenous lands. The Court observed in Samaraka v 
Suriname that “rather than a privilege to use the land, which can be 
taken away by the State or trumped by real property rights of third 
parties, members of indigenous and tribal peoples must obtain title to 
their territory in order to guarantee its permanent use and 
enjoyment.”200 It further noted that: 
this title must be recognized and respected, not only in practice, but also 
in law, in order to ensure its legal certainty. In order to obtain such title, 
the territory traditionally used and occupied by the members of the 
Saramaka people must first be delimited and demarcated, in consultation 
with such people and other neighboring peoples.201  
Ultimately, the work of the Inter-American Court is a step in the 
right direction. However, it would better if more of such mechanisms 
are established, ensuring indigenous peoples can enforce rights to 
their lands. 
 
No. 79, ¶ 149. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See generally id. ¶¶ 131–34 (explaining the factors applied by the Court 
when determining whether restitution rights have lapsed, namely, whether the 
indigenous peoples’ beliefs are tied to their relationship with the land and whether 
a relationship with the land is actually possible). 
 200. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 115 (Mar. 29, 2006); see 
also Lisi Brunner, The Rise of Peoples’ Rights in the Americas: The Saramaka 
People Decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,7 CHINESE J. INT’L 
L. 699 (2008) (supporting the idea that Suriname should get ownership in the land 
to support the indigenous people in the spirit of the American Convention, which 
promotes the idea of human rights as determined “by the security of all, and by the 
just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society”). 
 201. Id. 
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D. INTERIM CONCLUSION 
It is clear from this analysis of the most important initiatives 
relating to the enforcement of indigenous land rights that several 
different avenues are being pursued in an attempt to achieve better 
protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights. The ICCPR remains a 
seminal point of departure for invoking indigenous land rights. 
However, effective procedures and mechanisms of international 
review must be established to screen every alleged state violation of 
indigenous land rights and to ensure accountability in cases of 
violations. 
VI. ASSESSMENT 
Are state obligations concerning indigenous land rights lex 
imperfecta, namely, normative obligations without any sanction for 
violations? Do indigenous people have court access when their land 
rights are infringed upon? The above sections have demonstrated that 
indigenous peoples are largely excluded from international forums 
when seeking to enforce their rights.202 If monitoring mechanisms 
exist, they are at best ineffective and at worst only hold symbolic 
significance for the enforcement of indigenous land rights. Because 
international enforcement mechanisms under ILO Convention 169 
and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples are non-
existent, indigenous peoples are left with quasi-judicial mechanisms 
such as the system of individual communication under the ICCPR. 
However, even such a system of individual communication under 
ICCPR is far from perfect. The views of the Human Rights 
Committee reveal some problems with the monitoring system, 
particularly the Human Rights Committee’s inability to impose 
binding decisions on states. Although, over the course of many years, 
in some cases the Human Rights Committee found states to be in 
violation of Article 27, neither the Human Rights Committee nor any 
other UN expert body has the authority to impose sanctions on states 
for such violations. Most of the underlying weaknesses of the work 
 
 202. See Harriet Ketley, Exclusion by Definition: Access to International 
Tribunals for the Enforcement of the Collective Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 8 
INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 331, 357 (2001) (finding that, because 
indigenous rights are defined as “individual” rights, indigenous peoples lack the 
power that comes from collective rights). 
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of the ICCPR can be directly tied to the unenforceable nature of its 
views. More importantly, it appears that the greatest shortcoming of 
the work of the Human Rights Committee is the lack of sanctioning 
mechanisms.  
Given the possibility of reforming the Optional Protocol in the 
future, revisions may be needed to tackle this inadequacy, which 
could potentially undermine the ICCPR’s effectiveness. To be clear, 
the argument here is not that the Human Rights Committee should be 
dissolved. It plays a seminal role in monitoring state compliance with 
the ICCPR. Rather, the argument is that the Human Rights 
Committee could play a considerable role in setting up an 
advantageous framework for regulating state activities, including in 
relation to indigenous rights. The views of the Human Rights 
Committee suggest that the ICCPR could play a constructive role in 
efforts to improve state responsibility for human rights, even with its 
lack of authority to issue binding decisions and impose sanctions. 
Empowering the Human Rights Committee to engage in binding 
dispute resolution and to apply sanctions would, however, require a 
significant revision of the ICCPR and its protocols, a process that 
states parties may oppose, potentially undermining the entire system 
that has developed to date. By all accounts, it is therefore not 
unreasonable to conclude that the implementation procedure under 
the ICCPR must be strengthened for the Human Rights Committee 
system to effectively regulate state compliance with civil and 
political rights. 
When states interfere with the individual and collective rights of 
indigenous peoples, effective complaints mechanisms have to be 
established to provide remedies for alleged indigenous land rights 
violations. A lack of access to legal orders is still the major obstacle 
to the enjoyment of indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral 
lands. Given the inadequacy of international mechanisms to hold 
states directly accountable, at least in international forums, 
accountability in national legal orders, and possibly also at the 
international level, must be strengthened and sharpened. Taking into 
account that there is only one relative effective mechanism within the 
architecture of accountability, the underlying mechanism would have 
to be developed.  
Given that there is no effective judicial protection of indigenous 
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land rights, issues such as inaccessibility should be addressed, and 
national judicial systems should be strengthened. States must be 
accountable for the failure to meet their indigenous land rights 
obligations. Where a state fails to meet its obligations, adequate and 
effective remedies must be available to victims whose human rights 
have been violated. In the future, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council may consider establishing an expert working group or 
complaints mechanisms to receive the complaints of individuals and 
peoples. Some commentators have already argued for a world court 
of human rights.203 Even though such a proposal might seem utopian, 
such a complaints body might also consider communications from 
indigenous peoples as victims of land rights violations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The cultural survival and existence of the Nuba peoples and other 
indigenous peoples is tied to their ancestral land. If the ethnic 
cleansing perpetrated by the Sudanese government proves successful, 
a vital part of their identity will have been taken away. This article 
has argued that state obligations concerning indigenous land rights 
derive from international and national levels. The overall aim of this 
article was to examine state obligations with respect to indigenous 
land rights. Indigenous peoples perceive property rights as collective, 
not as individual. In this way, states are obliged to observe collective 
indigenous land tenure systems. This article argued that states have 
an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill indigenous land rights. 
While it can be concluded that indigenous land rights are well 
incorporated into some national legal orders, it is also evident that 
they could be generally better protected, implemented, and enforced. 
Yet it appears that those state obligations are more or less lex 
imperfecta—they do not provide clear sanctions in the event of 
violations.  
The protection and promotion of indigenous land rights generally 
suffers from a lack of effective enforcement at the international level. 
 
 203. See, e.g., Martin Scheinin, Towards a World Court of Human Rights: 
Research Report Within the Framework of the Swiss Initiative to Commemorate 
the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Apr.  
30, 2009), http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/Professors/ 
Scheinin/WorldCourtReport30April2009.pdf; Manfred Nowak, The Need for a 
World Court of Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV., 251 (2007). 
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Attempts should be made to reform the implementation of 
indigenous land rights in national systems and at the international 
level, in the hopes of improving indigenous peoples’ access to 
justice. It is therefore necessary to reform the complaints 
mechanisms to enforce the protection of indigenous land rights, 
particularly at the national level. If reforms do not occur, the 
indigenous land rights of the Nuba peoples and other indigenous 
peoples will be left unprotected, and all normative documents will be 
left unenforced.  
 
